What explains the variation in piracy along
Introduction
Protection Theory (PT) is a set of propositions that describes the properties of the commodity 'protection' and predicts the actions of its providers. It has been used by economists, historians and political theorists to explain the emergence of the mod ern state (e.g. Lane 1958; Nozick 1974; Tilly 1985; Olson 1993 Olson , 2000 . Recently, several authors have adopted it to account for the behaviour of gangs, organized crime and the Mafia (Gambetta 1993; Chu 2000; Varese 2001; Frye 2002; Hill 2003; Campana 2011; Wang 2011; Slade 2012; Campana and Varese 2013; Densley 2013; Pottenger 2014) . This literature spans several disciplines and suggests analytical links between the beha viour of states and that of criminal groups. The key insight of this theory is to distin guish between those who commit a crime and/or trade in criminal commodities, from those who make sure that promises are kept and more broadly 'protect' the exchange. Following Shortland and Varese (2012) , the paper applies this distinction to the case of Somali piracy.
The empirical and theoretical puzzle addressed here is that only a few sections of Somali coastland have harboured pirates, and some coastal areas switched from pro tecting pirates to protecting trade and even engaging in counterpiracy. What are the determinants of such a choice? While PT convincingly argues that 'bandits' with a long term horizon have an incentive to become 'stationary' rulers, protect producers and limit tax extraction (Olson 1993) , under which conditions do they decide to protect some activities as opposed to others? Since protectors are maximizing both revenue and their political longevity, we suggest that protection is supplied to criminals where there are no comparable alternative sources of revenue for the protector; and particularly when the protectors face challenges over political and/or territorial control. These hypotheses are tested against a detailed analysis of the geography of piracy and a number of indepth case studies of pirate anchorages. We examine the geography of Somali piracy both across space and over time.
We show that economic considerations led to the exclusion of pirates from areas producing export goods and adjoining trade routes. Pirates' ransoming activities were confined to a few anchorages on the Puntland and Central Somali Coast, because there was little alternative taxable economic activity. We show that changed economic incentives induced local stakeholders to switch away from protecting pirates to more lucrative (and legal) alternatives. Local politics determines the intensity of piracy in piracyprone regions. Interclan conflict and the (threatened) incursion of religious militias made it imperative to raise funds for territorial defence. We show that territo rial disputes and electoral challenges led to more intense use of pirate anchorages. We conclude by drawing implications for PT and evaluating the likely effectiveness of current landbased counterpiracy initiatives. We argue that longterm development initiatives are likely to undermine the key input to the Somali piracy business, namely landside support for ransoming hijacked ships.
PT and Somali piracy
PT shares key assumptions with rational choice theory (Elster 1986 ), namely rationa lity and invisiblehand types of explanations (UllmannMargalit 1978; Nozick 1994 ). In addition, it assumes selfinterest on the part of the actors involved in this activ ity. Some key theoretical propositions have been developed by PT. They include the observation that most trading engenders the risk of predation and unfulfilled prom ises for the trading partners and thus a demand for protection emerges to insure producers and traders against predators and unfulfilled promises. Division of labour leads to the emergence of specialists in enforcing promises and security as distinct from those specialized in the production of goods and services that do not require the use of violence. When protectors have a longtime horizon, they are expected to provide a genuine service from which clients/customers benefit. However, protection is a special commodity that is subject to economies of scale-it is cheaper to protect several customers rather than just one-and it is a (contestable) monopoly: there can only be one protector in a given domain. Because they are monopolists, protectors charge for their services more than what it costs them to produce those services and fight off attempts to encroach on their domain. Finally, building and maintaining a reputation for effective protection has the effect of enabling the protector to save on the production of the good itself (Lane 1958; Nozick 1974; Tilly 1985; Gambetta 1993; Olson 1993; Varese 2010; intellectual ancestors are Machiavelli 1532; Hobbes 1651) .
PT has also been used to explain state building, in particular by Tilly (1985) . This approach suggests that the key stimulus to building and centralizing state authority is war. States need to mobilize resources internally (through taxation and debt) and to neutral ize internal rivals (state making) when they face external threats. In this scenario nor mally applied to early modern Europe, rulers also protect effectively those who support their efforts. A key implication of the theory is that a dominant institution or a social class invests and benefits from state building. Conversely, the lack of external threats and internally divided elites lead to weak states, as it is the case in Latin America (Centeno 1997) .
The aim of this paper is to address a neglected question in PT: at what point does the 'stationary bandit' stop protecting fellow bandits plundering neighbouring villages? Such a form of thieving might be protected simply because it generates income for the ruler or because it promotes the stationary bandit's broader strategy. The logical con clusion of such a strategy would lead to a war with one's neighbour. Alternatively, the warlord can stop protecting what is generally recognized as a criminal activity affecting outsiders, and outlaw it. The history of Mafias offers insights into the mechanisms that lead to the opposite outcome, namely when protectors switch from legal to illegal mar kets. For instance, the Sicilian and the Russian Mafias started off protecting property rights and business disputes in the legal economy but when put under pressure by the legitimate state, they moved significantly towards the protection of illegal trades, such as drugs and prostitution (Gambetta 1993; Varese 2001) . In these instances, a 'chal lenger', namely the legitimate state, was forcing Mafias to change their behaviour. On the other hand, criminal support might be actively solicited by local politicians that face challengers in the local elections. Thus, it is a common occurrence in countries such as the United States, Italy, Russia and Taiwan that criminal groups have supported candi dates in hotly contested elections (Landesco 1929; Gambetta 1993; Varese 2001 , Chin 2003 . The key question we examine in this paper is under what circumstances 'station ary bandits' choose to offer protection to criminal activities directed towards others, such as piracy, and under what circumstances they choose not to. In the Conclusions, we also reflect how this process affects the process of state building.
In order to explore this question and test related hypotheses, we use the case of Somali piracy. Shortland and Varese (2012) and World Bank (2013a) established that Somali pirates buy protection from local (clan or religious) elites and their militias for ships moored off the coast of the relevant territory. Somali clans-the equivalent of 'stationary bandits' in PT-have a long tradition of protecting trade flows through their territory and ports, as well as fishing and mining activities. Issuing 'licenses' to traders, mining companies and fishermen, and 'taxation' at roadblocks and harbours provide a steady flow of income. During the civil war these revenues have been fought over by clan, religious and private (warlord) militias, which form the current local elites. Protection has also been granted to highly profitable illegal enterprises such as piracy, human traf ficking and drug and weapons smuggling. Yet, there are many examples of local authori ties which refused to provide services to pirates and actively drove them out of their area. Below we outline existing theories and then derive our own hypotheses based on PT.
World Bank (2013a) makes the case that neither physical geography nor onshore infrastructure explain the concentration of pirate anchorages on the Central Somali and Puntland coasts. The absence of transport and communication networks and the presence of rugged coastlines and coral reefs do make much of the coastline unsuit able for piracy, but the distribution of gently shelving beaches and settlement patterns in the coastal regions is fairly similar across regions. Existing explanations of the geography of piracy therefore argue that specific anchorages were chosen because of their favourable political conditions. Ransom negotiations favour whichever party is less keen to conclude the negotiations; rich shipowners pay maximum ransoms when pirates demonstrate that they could hold the ship indefinitely (De Groot et al. 2012) . Pirates have to invest considerable social and financial capital in building support for piracy in a location, and many of these payments are made upfront, such as anchorage fees, lavish hospitality for local dignitaries, bribes to local officials and khat supplies for guards (Hansen 2009; UN Security Council 2010; Shortland and Varese 2012; World Bank 2013a) . Pirates would avoid paying these 'sunk costs' in locations where protec tion arrangements could be disrupted by an outside challenger (requiring additional payments) or within the reach of the law enforcement officers of a regional authority. Thus, local governance must be stable and effective for pirates to choose a place for their anchorage.
B. Coggins (unpublished data) thus argued that Southern Somalia was simply 'too unstable' to produce piracy, while the northernwestern region of Somaliland, which borders with Ethiopia and Djibouti, was 'too stable ', echoing De Groot et al.'s (2012) 'sweet spot' for worldwide piracy in the lower intermediate region of the governance spectrum. Shortland and Percy (2013) showed that Somali piracy thrived in times of relative stability: periods of widespread anarchy were disruptive to the pirate business. The World Bank (2013a) refined these arguments further, relating piracy to the degree of political fragmentation in different localities. If too many stakeholders compete for power, then pirates will be unable to costeffectively build a stable alliance condoning piracy. If the degree of local political fragmentation is low, then central government can offer locals a better economic deal than pirates could. Pirates therefore locate in the intermediate range of political fragmentation, where they have an edge over cen tral government in building stakeholder support. World Bank (2013a) then argues that power was 'too fragmented' in Southern Somalia and 'too concentrated' in Somaliland for pirates to locate there. In this work, we consider the other side of this coin, namely why some local elites accepted pirates in the first place.
The protector's choice: the supply of protection
Our argument is based on the PT approach and focuses on the incentives of the protec tors. Clans, warlords or religious groupings, effectively run profit maximizing protec tion businesses (Shortland and Varese 2012; see Lane 1958) . If a coastal area is suitable for piracy, it can also support a range of other maritime businesses. However, the local protector has to make a choice between protecting trade and fishing, and protecting pirates. Traders and trawlers shun pirateinfested waters. Figure 1 shows a 24hour snap shot of vessel tracks taken on 26 January 2011. The concentration of shipping traffic immediately off the Indian, Omani and Yemeni coasts and the dearth of vessels in the middle of the Indian Ocean (particularly along what would be the most costeffective route from Hormuz to the Cape) illustrates the effect of pirates on private sector deci sions. We expect that protectors choose whether to protect pirates or trade based on which activity provides the highest payoff.
Protection of piracy ensures a flow of income (such as the anchorage fee, militia employment and taxes on suppliers). As a ballpark estimate, World Bank (2013a) data suggest average ransoms of US$ 4.9mn in 2011/12 of which up to 86 per cent went to 'landside' stakeholders (as opposed to investors and the men in the boats). In the International Maritime OrganizationWorld Bank (IMOWB) data set on the geography of Somali piracy, the average ship is associated with 1.34 anchorages (several ships are associated with two or more anchorages). If the local protectors collected the entire land side surplus, the average ship brought them US$3.14mn in revenues. Eight ships were taken to the busiest anchorages in 2011-Garacad and Hobyo in Central Somalia-giv ing (at best) US$ 25.2mn in annual revenues for local stakeholders. However, the income flow is lumpy and its timing is unpredictable as ransom negotiations can drag on for several years (De Groot et al. 2012; World Bank 2013a) . Ransom distributions are some times associated with armed conflict between pirates (see, e.g. All Africa 16/ VIII/2011; Somalia Report, 7-14/VIII/2012 , 30/X/2011 and 29/XI/ 2011 ). In addition, protect ing pirates is the equivalent of offering shelter to bandits that attack other nations (in this case foreign ships) engendering the risk that these nations will strike back. This conside ration would have been salient given a history of drone attacks on Somali com munities harbouring 'terrorists' (New York Times 7/IV/2013). Community concerns became reali ty in May 2012 with the EU attack on a pirate 'beach camp' (Somalia Report 5/V/2012). There is therefore a significant cost associated with taking pirate money.
Protection of trade provides a more reliable flow of resources. The UN Monitoring Group (UN Security Council 2011) estimated that the annual income of Al Shabab in Southern Somalia from taxation and extortion was in the region of US$70-100 mn, compared to aver age total pirate ransoms in 2008-12 of US$50 mn per annum (World Bank 2013a). Taxation of charcoal exports alone was estimated to raise around US$25 mn for Al Shabab in Kismayo in Southern Somalia (UN Security Council 2012). Each vessel docked at Kismayo harbour was charged between US$90,000 and US$300,000 in export duties for charcoal. The same vessels also brought sugar for reexport to Kenya and were charged fees for unloading their cargo. Traders, charcoal producers and porters were in addition charged a tax of 2. Authorities deriving significant incomes from the 'taxation' of trade (or the produc tion of exportables) will therefore not supply protection to pirates. However, elites in remote areas, which do not have the option of taxing other economic activity, might consider protecting piracy.
Hypothesis 1: The decision to supply protection services to pirates is primarily driven by economic considerations.
Testable implications are as follows:
(a) Pirate anchorages will not be located close to highvalue trade routes but in areas cut off from regional commerce. (b) Elites raising money though protection of trade may take direct action against trawlers and traders who have not paid protection money, as well as against pirates.
In some communities, the expected revenues from protecting trade and sheltering pirates will be similar. In such areas, we expect that the availability of pirate protec tion changes when economic shocks change the local costbenefit analysis: e.g., when trade restrictions are lifted or local authorities could profit from taxing additional legal trade, they might stop harbouring pirates. Examples of exogenous economic shocks are the bans on Somali livestock exports and oil discoveries. Economic shocks could also be created through a political process where a quid-pro-quo is offered in exchange for local counterpiracy efforts. A testable implication is that (c) Piracy will cease in a location if the (expected) value or volume of trade or other development funds increase significantly, leading protectors to switch away from protecting piracy.
Running against the prevailing explanations of the geography of piracy, PT predicts that external challenges to local political elites should increase their willingness to supply protection to pirates. Pirate money might be actively solicited if there are potential chal lengers to local elites' territorial control, creating pressures to maintain a large clan mili tia or increase its size. Such challenges could be external or internal, and can include electoral challenges to an incumbent who fears will lose an electoral contest if he does not accept criminal money. We therefore expect the intensity of piracy to increase with interclan tensions, as religious groups or regional governments seek to expand their territorial control, during border disputes and, potentially, with the spread of electoral democracy. Would such challenges lead to a process of state building as it was the case of early modern Europe? This is a question we shall touch upon in the Conclusions. Hypothesis 2: Reliance on revenues from criminal activities will increase when the local elite faces territorial challenges.
This leads to the following testable implication:
(d) Political instability short of outright anarchy-such as latent border disputes and electoral challenges-will lead to increased pirate activity in areas already relying on criminal revenues.
Extreme political instability in an area hinders the ability to protect and hence drives to zero the demand for protection services. As pointed out by PT, there must be a monopo ly over protection in the area. However, as argued previously, the key issue in supplying protection to pirates is an economic consideration: there is no more profitable revenue source. Therefore, pirates should not be concerned about who wields power in a locality: neither incoming nor outgoing administrations want to drive away the goose with the golden eggs. While pirates might take their ships further offshore during heavy fighting, we would expect them to return once a new administration is formed. Our final testable implication from PT is therefore:
(e) There will be continuity in pirate anchorage utilization across political changes. Table 1 summarizes our hypotheses: whether or not a location offers protection for pirates depends primarily on the local economic situation. Put simply, the relative size of the two income sources for the protector (trade and piracy) can be likened to an 'on/off' switch: when there are significant opportunities to tax trade, we do not expect to find piracy. Pirates locate only where there are few opportunities to tax trade. The effect of the local political situation can be likened to a 'volume control': for those communities where piracy is not desirable, the degree of political stability determines the amount of resources that are devoted to counterpiracy, with powerful incumbents chasing pirates away from 'their' trade routes. For communities where piracy is the most lucrative revenue source, strong and stable incumbents may still choose not to protect piracy. However, if the local elite feels threatened or needs to raise funds for election campaigns, the intensity of piracy increases. Greater instability will increase reliance on piracy revenues as long as the territory is not actively contested. We agree with previ ous analyses that hijack for ransom piracy is not viable during periods of warfare and anarchy, but this is not because the incumbent and challenger do not offer to supply protection, but because there is no demand for protection in a contested territory.
In the following section, we use a new data set of the geography of piracy to test our hypotheses, utilizing the considerable diversity of local responses to piracy across Somalia and within pirate anchorages over time.
Data and Methodology
To establish where pirates found protection, we (re)analyse the IMOWB data set on the geography of Somali piracy collected for the World Bank (2013a) Report. This data set provides the location(s) in which successfully hijacked vessels were held after their capture until their release.
1 The locations are based on interviews with locals, who pro vided information on which village or town was responsible for supplies and protection 1 The IMOWB database has some gaps, as not every hijacked ship made a landfall and not every location was reported. Some ships are linked to more than one anchorage, but there is no information of the timing of their movements. A ship is therefore associated with the reported anchorage(s) for all years spanned by the ransom negotiation, even if it was released in January or was moved between anchorages through the time in captivity.
for each ship, resulting in a highly granular picture of pirate locations. Twenty locations are associated with ships being held for ransom in the IMOWB data set though some report only one or two incidents. In the analysis, we focus on the top pirate anchorages: Eyl, Garacad, Hobyo and Haradhere, as well as the anchorages of the Ras Aseyr and Maakhir regions as shown on Map 1, as well as in Figures 2 and 3 .
We use the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) piracy reports for information on the vessel type in each incident to make a broad distinction between two kinds of maritime crimes. We consider incidents as 'piracy' where pirates targeted international shipping without economic interest in Somalia's ports or maritime resources. This type of piracy imposes large costs on the international community and littoral states (Besley et al. 2012; World Bank 2013a) . The ship types most likely to be associated with foreign merchant shipping are 'tankers', 'general cargo', 'bulk carriers', 'container ships' and 'yachts' (some general cargo ships were bound for Somalia, but mostly Somalia's mari time infrastructure is unable to deal with large, modern cargo ships).
We count as 'maritime crime' those incidents directed against local shipping traffic, identified in the IMB reports as 'dhows', ' World Food Programme (WFP) charters' and 'fishing vessels'. These attacks occurred mostly within territorial waters (6 nm) and the exclusive economic zone of (200 nm) of Somalia.
2 According to PT, such closeshore maritime crimes should be interpreted as the actions of informal coast guards. In the absence of a state able to enforce its territorial rights, local warlords, religious or clan militias sought to protect their maritime resources from foreign exploitation, asserted their claim on duties being paid in the local anchorages and tried to prevent local mar kets from being flooded with foreign food aid. Below, we present maps detailing the incidents split into the relevant vessel types (Figures 2). In the annual maps (Figures 3), we indicate disputes over territorial control by marking the areas in which different authorities asserted their rights to govern.
Discussion
Firstly, we examine whether trade protection or pirate protection is the rational economic choice of a local elite, showing that none of the Somalia's ports harboured pirates, while all the observed pirate anchorages are cut off from regional trade routes. We then move on to discussing what drives changes in the intensity of piracy in these remote piracyprone loca tions. Finally, we look at the effect of political turnover in established pirate anchorages.
Piracy and the port cities
Since looting during the civil war destroyed almost all of Somalia's productive capacity, the Somali economy has rested on three pillars: diaspora remittances, livestock and the re export economy (Marchal 2012) . Around 65 per cent of employment in Somalia is linked in some way to the livestock sector and livestock exports make up around 80 per cent of Somalia's export earnings (FSNAU 2013) . Most of the livestock is exported by sea to vari ous countries in the Arab peninsula, with live sheep and goats for slaughter at the annual Hajj pilgrimage, a particularly important market. Somalia's ports have also traditionally Source: IMOWB data set. smuggling into the border regions, a system that has been likened to 'a set of parallel con veyor belts' (Little 2006; Umar and Baulch 2007: 8) . Therefore, Somalia's ports handle a volume of trade, which greatly exceeds the productive and absorptive capacity of the Somali economy. The 'protection' of this trade is a major business. WFP logistics (2007) names only four major ports (Berbera, Bosasso, Mogadishu and Kismayo) and two minor natural harbours (Merka and el Ma'an near Mogadishu) in all of Somalia. Hypothesis 1a suggests that these ports should not offer anchorage to pirates, as trade protection would be the dominant choice. Indeed, no incidents of hijack for ransom were reported from Berbera, Mogadishu or el Ma'an. Closer inspection of the IMOWB database reveals that none of the incidents associated with the other major harbours are cases of hijack for ransom 'highseas' piracy, as shown in Table 2 .
The three 'incidents' in Kismayo reported in the IMOWB database relate to three fishing vessels accused of illegal fishing in August 2008 (See Figure 2) . Although the vessels' owners claimed that they had bought a 'license' from another warlord, they had to pay US$0.5mn for each vessel's release. This figure is comparable to the fines officially levied in West Africa on vessels engaged in illegal, unreported and unlicensed fishing (Interview 1). The episode is simply a case of the Kismayo authorities asserting their right to tax economic activity in their waters. Overall, administrations in Kismayo focused on raising revenues through trade protection and Islamist administrations took a very public antipiracy stance. SHORTLAND AND VARESE heartlands were carried out by the Union of Islamic Courts, which governed Merka at the time. Merka, therefore, seems to be protecting trade rather than business. Not only Berbera's, but all of Somaliland's track record on piracy is excellent. The only instance of maritime crime associated with Somaliland in the World Bank data base is that of the fishing trawler El Greco 2, apprehended for illegal fishing and held at Ras Shula (Pan African Newswire 23/V/2010). In a different report the same ship is linked to Bosasso, again being investigated about the legitimacy of its activities, mak ing this a clear case of informal coastguarding rather than an act of highseas piracy (Ecoterra 19/IV/2009). Dua (2011) stresses the political importance of counterpiracy in Somaliland in terms of gaining international recognition. However, the economic reality was that the Somaliland government critically relied on customs revenues col lected at Berbera port. Although other forms of taxation have been introduced over time, in 2011 the government still raised 46 per cent of its revenues through taxes on international trade (Republic of Somaliland, 2011). Piracy was generally perceived to undermine economic wellbeing in Somaliland through its impact on trade volumes, employment and import prices (Sabahi News 31/I/ 2012). The Somaliland government was therefore able to coopt local clans into denying anchorage to pirates.
According to the IMOWB database, Bosasso was never used as a destination for hijacked merchant ships either.
3 Nonetheless, Bosasso was commonly associated with piracy between 2005 and 2008: it had a reputation as a settingoff and resupply port, as well as welcoming pirate investments (Congressional Research Service 28/IX/2009). In late 2008, Bosasso's authorities began efforts to shake off the town's pirate image. The city's Uturn on piracy is that trade in Bosasso had been depressed due to the Saudi export ban on livestock from Somalia. Because of concerns over rift valley fever, all official livestock exports had to be taken to holding pens in Djibouti for a quarantine period or be exported 'unofficially'. Either option undermined the volume and profitability of exports through Bosasso.
Local elites realized that with the lifting of the export ban Bosasso would recover its position as a primary trading port for livestock and through the 'parallel conveyor belt' as an import centre for the wider region. The Puntland Port of Bossaso is our economic lifeline and our gateway to global trade networks. .... Any threat to this vital economic lifeline is a threat against the security, stability and economy of Puntland State of Somalia, which also impacts the smooth flow of trade traffic across the whole region (Garowe Online 22 October 2011).
As stated previously, there are no reports of hijacked ships being taken to Mogadishu or el Ma'an. The major trading ports of Somalia therefore all denied protection and some actively discouraged pirates from operating in their areas in line with implica tion (a). Local protectors have, however, targeted aid deliveries, local trade and fishing vessels, which had not paid the right people the correct amount of protection money. By doing so, they simply enforced their system of 'taxation' in line with implication (b). The fact that Bosasso 'switched' its attitude to pirates with the change in the prof itability of trade protection is evidence for implication (c).
Poor, remote areas and piracy
We now turn our attention to explaining where piracy occurs. Hypothesis 1 says that areas remote from lucrative trade routes are more likely to condone or welcome pirates. Roadmaps of Somalia show the main transport arteries running between Berbera/Hargeisa and Garowe and from Bosasso via Garowe to Mogadishu and Kismayo (see Map 1).
Detailed information on road conditions and travel times is periodically provided by the WFP logistics cluster. Road quality is highly variable due to lack of maintenance, floods, landslides and deliberate sabotage (particularly of bridges). Some tracks become entirely impassable during the rainy season. A WFP map from May 2010 shows how cut off the 'pirate' coast of Puntland and Central Somalia is from regional markets (World Food Program Logistics Cluster 2010). It puts the travel time from regional centres to their geographically closest pirate anchorages (using fourwheeldrive vehicles) at between 11 and 29 hours. This means that local elites can raise very limited amounts of tax from passing trade. In addition, there is little scope for local taxation: their fisheries are cut off from inland consumers and the landscape is barren and supports an itinerant pastoral economy, which is notoriously difficult to tax. 4 However, not all remote Puntland coastal communities engaged in piracy all of the time and some did so with varying intensity.
Hypothesis 2 suggests a link between territorial disputes and piracy, arguing that if local political elites face a threat to their territorial control or wish to assert their claim to govern additional territory, they are likely to seek further revenue sources. Our cho sen observable indicators for territorial challenges are (1) the closely fought election campaign in Puntland in 2009 and (2) different political entities officially asserting competing claims on a particular territory. The latter occurred where the precise loca tion of borders was disputed between two established political entities and because new claimants declared a specific territory a 'federal state' of the Republic of Somalia. Generally, the declared aims of these states were to reduce interference of regional governments in local governance, to manifest a claim on disputed grazing lands and to protect mineral and water resources from exploitation by outsiders. The selfappointed state governments sought to tax local economic activity, attract diaspora remittances and license foreign companies to explore or exploit mineral deposits and fish in territorial waters. Moreover, if the administration was sufficiently credible, its representatives were invited to represent the state's interests in the constitutional process in Mogadishu in 2012 (Somalia Report 4/V/2012). Several (but not all) of the declared states mobilized security forces to enforce their territorial claims, but generally security force presence outside the principal towns was scant or nonexistent. Hence, most states did not actu ally control the territories to which they laid claim. Several of the declared states over lapped with each other as different subclans laid claim to territory, where grazing and water rights had been disputed for centuries. In Central Somalia, such disputes were aggravated by the influx of Islamist militias, which also rely on territorial control for recruiting new fighters and taxing economic activity (World Bank 2013a) . This further complicates the issue of how much territory was controlled by each state government.
At the regional level, competing territorial claims created an environment in which criminal gangs were tolerated. The state administrations were neither willing nor able to address a crime entirely directed against 'outsiders' rather than members of their own community . For example, President Aden of the HimanandHeeb state when asked about a wellknown pirate boss building his new compound in central Adado right behind the police station argued:
I'd take these guys on, but I can't right now because I don't have the resources... Besides, you can't just wipe out a whole line of work for thousands of young men. If you take something away, you must replace it with something else. Otherwise, more problems (New York Times 2/X/2009).
At the local level, however, the relationship between clan officials and pirates went beyond mere toleration. Piracy brings considerable revenue to the local community and espe cially to those within the community who can organize protection for pirates (World Bank 2013a; Shortland and Varese 2012) . Inter and intraclan tensions raised the need for addi tional revenue to bolster the clan militia, and in some cases, there was direct cooperation between clan and pirate militias in defence of clan territory against invasion (New York Times 1/IX/2010). Based on PT, one would therefore expect elites under threat of invasion and those with territorial ambitions to invite pirates-or even sponsor a piracy business.
We now examine the states claiming sovereignty over coastal territories created between 2006 and 2011. We would expect that piracy would start before a new state is formally declared (to bolster the claimant's finances) and to cease when a state achieves its aims or gives up its ambition. In addition we highlight the effect of the 2009 election on pirate activity in Puntland.
Maakhir and Ras Aseyr
Two states were declared in Puntland territory and both are associated with pirate activ ity (Somalia Report 4/V/2012). Maakhir in Northern Puntland West of Bosasso was established in 2007 over disagreements with the Puntland authorities over how to share potential oil and mining revenues. for a fish factory and port development in LasQorey (Interview 2). Maakhir was sub sumed back into Puntland and piracy ceased.
The Ras Aseyr region at the NorthWestern tip of Puntland also started to develop piracy in the runup to the 2009 presidential election. However, unlike Maakhir, local clans failed to get a good deal from the new government. Local disappointments about the absence of development assistance from the Puntland authorities were exacerbated by the impression that locals would gain nothing from oil exploration in Northern Puntland. Piracy intensified and the new state of Ras Aseyr was formally announced in April 2011, banning Puntland state officials from its territory (Somaliland Press 21/ IV/2011 and Hiiraan News 25/IV/2011). The Puntland government refused to recog nize the Ras Aseyr state and engaged its militias on a number of occasions. 6 The mili tias fighting the Puntland security forces were funded by pirate money-specifically from the pirate entrepreneur Isse Yulux, who had operations in several anchorages between the Ras Hafun peninsula and Callula just East of Bosasso (Somalia Report 20/IV/2011; World Bank 2013b). The Northern Puntland anchorages were used more intensively from 2010 than in any of the previous periods and remained pirate strong holds in 2012, indicating that piracy money was instrumental in funding the political ambitions of local elites.
Piracy at Eyl and the 2009 presidential election
Eyl dominated Somali piracy in 2008 and 2009 and then ceased operating as a pirate anchorage. Eyl is controlled by a powerful subclan of Puntland's dominant Darod clan and was neither attacked nor developed separatist ambitions. Yet, piracy took off in April 2008 when the Puntland government's financial position became so precarious that it was unable to pay most of its security forces (Hansen 2009 ). Pirates did not fear intervention and proliferated with reinvested profits. Protection money was paid to people in the Puntland administration and was used to fund the election campaign of Abdirahman Farole for the presidency of Puntland as documented by the UN Security Council (2010; .
When Abdirahman Farole became president of Puntland in January 2009 his piracy connections became an embarrassment (see UN Security Council 2010) . From 2010, pirates no longer used the anchorage at Eyl to conduct ransom business. What was the quid-pro-quo given to Eyl for giving up piracy? The main request made by President Farole to potential donors was a road to connect Eyl to Somalia's main transport net work. This would have allowed Eyl to attract (and protect) trade flows and transport fish products to inland markets. However, the donor community refused this proposal because it was thought that a road would be a bonus to the pirates and funding was never approved (Interview 2).
Instead, in 2010/11, money donated by the Japanese Social Development Fund was used to purchase fishing vessels and equipment and fishermen were trained to reha bilitate the local fishing industry. A refrigerated truck was purchased to transport fish products from Eyl to inland markets (Interview 2). A more important benefit came from United Arab Emirate funding for the Puntland Maritime Police Force (PMPF).
The PMPF was based Bosasso with a forward base at Eyl and was intended to target piracy in Puntland. At least 70 per cent of recruits belonged to President Farole's sub clan (Interview 3). The highly critical report by UN Security Council (2012) suggests that Mr Farole had effectively found a foreign sponsor for his clan militia. The PMPF was rapturously received at Eyl (Puntland Post 17/III/2012), undertook counterpiracy operations only against pirates of rival subclans (Somalia Report 3VI/2012 and 6/ VI/2012) and hassled President Farole's political rivals (Horseed Media 31/X/2012) .
In summary, pirates were welcome in Eyl when they were needed to fund a political campaign. After electoral success, piracy stopped and the political porkbarrel process was used to improve the economic situation of the clan instead. But not enough was delivered to turn the tide decisively against pirates: Pirate bosses were not arrested, but moved to the anchorages at Garacad to the South or in Northern Puntland instead. Occasionally hijacked ships transited the area unmolested or remained in the vi cinity for short periods of time (and are therefore associated with Eyl in the IMOWB database).
Border disputes and 'states' in Central Somalia
The main pirate anchorages of Garacad, Hobyo and Haradhere and a number of smaller anchorages in Central Somalia are located in a territory that is claimed by both Puntland and Galmudug.
7 Local elites used piracy to raise funds to fight for their preferred settlement. In 2010, Garacad took on additional pirate business-most likely from gangs that previously had used the anchorage at Eyl. Table 3 and the annual diagrams in Figure 3 provide clear evidence that piracy and informal coastguarding activities intensified in remote regions when these were disputed between clans wishing to share in locally generated profits. Piracy only stopped where the local authorities completely achieved their objectives of formal political representation and financial transfers.
Piracy and instability
Finally we test implication (e), which allows us to directly engage with the alternative hypothesis that the key determinant of piracy is political instability, rather than the economic decision to protect the most lucrative business. The evidence from Mogadishu does not allow us to distinguish between the two hypotheses. Mogadishu's port remained closed or was barely used, as various militias fought for control of Somalia's previously most lucrative interface with the world (Marchal 2002) , making it impossible to conduct any kind of longterm business there-including piracy. This argument is then extended to cover all of Southern Somalia, which has indeed seen the majority of casualties and conflict events in the civil war (Chojnacki and Metternich 2008 We, therefore, argue that there is no causal link between the observed political insta bility and the absence of piracy in Southern Somalia. Taxable agricultural production in the river areas and the concentration of major trade routes makes it attractive to contest territorial control (Chojnacki and Metternich 2008) . But whoever controls the territory will take a counterpiracy stance and protect trade. Thus, revenue opportuni ties from trade protection explain both the violence and the antipiracy stance.
In accordance with implication (e) in those areas where piracy was established, politi cal upheaval does not necessarily matter: economics, not politics determine whether a place is a pirate anchorage. Our example is the Al Shabab take over of Haradhere in May 2010. Islamists in Southern Somalia (including the Al Shabab) were known to fight piracy and had expressed this as a moral issue based on Sharia law. Many commentators there fore expected piracy in Haradhere to cease with the arrival of Islamists (New York Times 3V/2010). However, pirates did not move their ships away from Haradhere anchorage. The captivity of the UBT Ocean and the Samho Dream at Haradhere spanned the change over of power and neither ship is associated with any other anchorage in the IMOWB data set. Later that same year the Golden Wave, the Izumi, the Orna and the Albedo were brought into Haradhere: the identity of the protector was immaterial to the pirates. Table 4 summarizes how the case studies fit into our hypothesis. The propirate loca tions are all in the 'low trade' category and piracy waxed and waned with challenges to the territorial control of elites. Eyl and LasQorey illustrated how criminal money can be used to change political outcomes. The major export/import hubs engaged in coun terpiracy if they were stable enough-and in the case of Bosasso-trade flows were sufficient to make this worthwhile. Given the potential for collecting significant trade revenues in Mogadishu, we are unsurprised that Somalia's federal President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud prioritized counterpiracy policy early in his tenure.
Conclusions
A puzzle that has long been neglected in the study of the hijacking of foreign ves sels off the costs of Somalia is why only certain parts of the country's coastland were susceptible to this kind of crime. The paper offers an answer, drawing upon PT and a new data set of piracy incidents in Somalia from 2005 to 2012. First, we make a distinction between providers of pirate security and protection, and those who directly engage in the crime. By focusing on what we call the Protector's Choice, we showed that piracy is only likely to occur in poor areas that are remote from regional trading routes and harbours. If the revenues from taxing trade are significantly higher than those expected from piracy, local elites engage actively in informal coastguarding and counterpiracy activities. However, when trade flows are rerouted due to exogenous shocks, local elites accept (or switch to) the rev enues coming from pirates. In the remote regions we observed more intense piracy when the local elites faced a challenge over territorial control and at times of hotly contested elections. As in the case of politicians in advanced democracies who are willing to accept the support of organized criminals, so Somali elites have been found to accept pirate money to fend off electoral challenges or to replenish their coffers in the face of territorial disputes. The paper has both theoretical and policy implications. Theoretically, we specify a mechanism that leads 'stationary bandits' to switch from protecting criminal activi ties directed against outsiders, to the protection of peaceful and productive economic endeavours. When taxation from trade is more profitable than taxation from crime, local elites stop supporting widespread criminality. This empirical result implies that the acceptance of pervasive illegality is not a cultural and immutable trait of certain societies. Jeffrey Gettleman, in his account of a British couple's ordeal as captives of Somali pirates, cites Paul Chandler as saying: 'Everybody was in on it […] I'm angry at Somali society. I'm angry at a community' (New York Times 5/X/2011). Mr Chandler was justified to be angry because piracy cannot operate without the protection of the local society. However, this paper shows that support for piracy can change rapidly. Yet the transition from crime to trade can as quickly be reversed in the face of exter nal or internal challenges. Would such threats lead to a process of state building, as it was the case in early modern Europe (Tilly 1985) ? The answer is negative. The clanbased structure of politics in Somalia prevents the emergence of a unified state able to take advantage of external threats. In addition, the threats we have docu mented are internal to each clan's territory and amount to fights among subclans over territory, or electoral challenges. These threats weaken the national state, which remains hollow at the core. The process of state building through wars mobilizing the entire population is absent in Somalia. Territorial challenges and electoral competi tion do not present opportunities for growth and do not mobilize the population in a national or regional project.
Some policy implications do follow from our analysis. Counterpiracy initiatives have so far been largely misguided. Such initiatives were initially targeted at local young men (and specifically pirates) through moral 'sensitization campaigns' or offering vocational training in alternative occupations (Bueger 2012) . Their effectiveness was limited for a number of reasons. Firstly, it is difficult to verify whether aid recipients have in fact given up piracy (Bueger 2012) . Secondly, one needs not only target the pirates but all underemployed young men in Somalia ready to replace those diverted from piracy. Thirdly, pirate bosses can simply raise pirate wages in response to alter native job opportunities (World Bank 2013a). We therefore argue that 'alternative livelihoods' policies targeted at the community through development assistance are more likely to produce sustainable counterpiracy than initiatives targeting the pirates directly. Access to markets, the construction of roads and maritime infrastructures promoting trade will reduce piracy.
Although maritime and road infrastructures will turn the tide against the protection of pirates, other forms of maritime crime, such as smuggling, trafficking and trade in illegal fish, can coexist with legitimate trade and such criminal opportunities would be enhanced by improved infrastructures. Ultimately, only a political project that leads either to the building a nationstate or-more plausibly-the breakup of the unitary state in favour of local forms of clanbased governance can be longterm solutions for Somalia.
